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Abstract 
Product counterfeiting is a serious problem causing the industry estimated losses of billions of dollars every year. With the 
increasing spread of e-commerce, the number of counterfeit products sold online increased substantially. We propose the 
adoption of a semi-automatic workflow to identify likely counterfeit offers in online platforms and to present these offers to a 
domain expert for manual verification. The workflow includes steps to generate search queries for relevant product offers, to 
match and cluster similar product offers, and to assess the counterfeit suspiciousness based on different criteria. The goal is to 
support the periodic identification of many counterfeit offers with a limited amount of manual effort. We explain how the 
proposed approach can be realized. We also present a preliminary evaluation of its most important steps on a case study using 
the eBay platform. 
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Introduction  
From a legal point of view, counterfeiting or product piracy refers to infringements against intellectual 
property rights, such as copyrights, trademarks and design rights (Organization of Economic 
Development 2007). Goods that violate these rights or which are purposely produced to defraud 
potential customers are called counterfeits, copies, imitations, knock-offs or fakes.  
The volume of product counterfeiting has substantially increased in the recent past. According to 
(European Commission 2013), the number of registered counterfeit cases at the European Customs 
almost increased by a factor of 18 since 2001, especially for small parcels in express and postal traffic 
that most likely result  from internet sales. The Int. Chamber of Commerce (www.icc-ccs.org/icc/cib) 
estimates that counterfeiting accounts for about 5 - 7% of world trade, i.e. about $600 billion a year. 
Almost all kinds of products are subject to counterfeiting, ranging from electronic devices and apparel 
to food and drugs. Fake products are offered and sold in numerous online shops and auction sites as 
well as on B2B marketplaces for wholesale trading.  Counterfeits not only cause an enormous economic 
loss, but can also damage the reputation of a company. Buyers of faked products not only receive a 
low-quality product in many cases, but may even be exposed to serious safety and health risks, e.g., in 
the case of faked medication (Rahm 2014). 
In this study, we focus on product imitations sold on the web without considering infringements of 
digital content such as software, music or videos. Taking actions against counterfeiting on the web is 
challenging due to the huge number of involved traders, websites and products. As the people behind 
product offers on the web are largely anonymous, counterfeiters can remain nameless and faceless. 
When counterfeit offers are detected and banned from a site, it takes little effort for an infringer to 
reappear on another site or under a new name (Roth 2011). Traditional efforts to fight counterfeiting 
include the use of technical means for product authentication such as holograms or RFID tags (Staake, 
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Thiesse and Fleisch 2005) (Jordan and Kutter 2012). While successful, these methods are not universally 
applicable or too expensive to control, e.g., for consumer products such as cosmetics and drugs.  For 
detecting counterfeits in web shops, these techniques become even less effective, because an online 
customer cannot verify the hologram or RFID tag of a product. Furthermore, counterfeiters often use 
the bait-and-switch strategy where the original image and description of a product are displayed on the 
website, yet an imitation is delivered (Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich 2011).   
Manually monitoring a large number of websites and searching for faked products is much too 
laborious and expensive. Hence, we see a strong need for automated methods to identify likely 
counterfeits and we will propose such an approach. While the counterfeit candidates still have to be 
manually verified, the proposed approach is expected to significantly reduce the time and cost for 
detecting counterfeits.  There are different operative and legal measures against detected 
counterfeiters: removing the offers infringing someone’s copyright or trademark, closing the account of 
the counterfeiter from the platform, or suing the counterfeiter. While legal actions are complex and 
time-consuming, the removal of counterfeits and counterfeiters are relatively easy as first steps and 
suitable for mass application. 
The need to automatically monitor web shops and other e-commerce platforms for counterfeits has 
been observed by others (e.g. (Pinsdorf and Ebinger 2005) (MarkMonitor 2012)), and there are also 
some companies specializing on this task. E-commerce sites like eBay also try to identify counterfeits on 
their platform1. However, we are not aware of any publications describing in some detail how to 
address the challenging task of automatically identifying likely counterfeits.  
                                                             
1
 http://pages.ebay.com/againstcounterfeits/  
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There are various parties who could benefit from a semi-automated monitoring and detection of 
counterfeits. Their goals differ in the number and type of products and in whether they are interested 
in only one or several online sales platforms:  
1. Manufactures (owners of the trademark / copyright) are only interested in detecting imitations 
of their own products. They likely have a specific list of their products and try to find 
counterfeits either within a specific online sales platform or across several such platforms.  
2. Public authorities (e.g., customs, police) can be interested in all imitations of one or several 
kinds of product(s), either within a specific platform or across several platforms.  
3. Owners of an online sales platform are interested in detecting all fake products of one or 
several product type(s) or manufacturer(s) distributed only on their own site.  
4. Consumers want to know if the offer they are interested in is genuine or not. 
In this study, we focus on describing and analyzing a semi-automatic approach to identify likely 
counterfeits on a single platform Part 2 explains the proposed workflow and its main techniques to find 
and cluster relevant offers and to score their trustworthiness.  In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 we present 
the setup for a case study on the eBay auction platform to show the applicability of the presented 
workflow and the results of our experiments. Finally we discuss the results and possible future work 
and research directions.   
A semi-automatic Approach to Detect Counterfeit Offers  
Workflow for analyzing and scoring product offers  
We propose a semi-automatic workflow to determine offers for specific products on e-commerce 
platforms to analyze and score their counterfeit suspiciousness. Figure 1 shows the main steps in the 
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proposed workflow that will be discussed below. We assume that a user specifies in an input file or 
selects interactively the products of interest. Depending on her requirements she may define specific 
products or broad product groups. She could also specify different web data sources (auction sites, web 
shops, etc.) to be examined but we will focus on a single site in this study.  
 
 
Figure 1 Workflow for detecting counterfeit offers 
The workflow steps are executed once or periodically and results can be stored in a database from 
which reports about potential counterfeits can be generated depending on the application needs. The 
main steps are the following:  
1. Querying product offers: The first step is to query or search all product offers that correspond 
to the specified products of interest.  This step entails the automatic generation of a potentially 
large number of suitable search queries tailored to the search capabilities of the sales platform. 
2. Extraction and transformation of product offers: The search results need to be processed to 
extract the individual product offers with their relevant attributes (e.g., product id, title, 
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retailer, price, date, or customer rating depending on the data source). The product offers are 
pre-processed and cleaned for the subsequent steps. 
3. Clustering of product offers: The retrieved product offers are clustered so that each cluster 
contains all offers of a specific product. This enables a comparison between different offers of 
the same product and can thus help to identify suspicious variations.  
4. Counterfeit Analysis and Scoring: In the last step, we use different criteria to derive  for each 
product offer a counterfeit score to indicate its likelihood of referring to a fake product. 
Suspicious offers are shown to the user for manual verification.  
In the following we discuss these steps in more detail.  
Query generation  
The basis for finding offers for counterfeit products is the search and extraction of product offers from 
online shops.  Searching for counterfeits is based on the specification of products of interest. These may 
be specific products or all products of a specific type and/or from a specific manufacturer.  Manually 
finding all relevant offers is generally infeasible so that we use the automatic generation of suitable 
search queries based on the supported query capabilities of the considered online sales platform. 
Typically, the search interface supports different query predicates such as keyword search in the 
product title and description, as well as searching for specific attributes such as manufacturer or 
product type.  
The challenge is to utilize these capabilities such that all relevant offers are found with a minimum of 
queries. This is complicated by the typically highly heterogeneous descriptions and frequently missing 
information in product offers. Furthermore, there is an inherent trade-off between recall and precision. 
So specific product queries using manufacturer-specific product codes (e.g., “Gucci - 3509/S”) or even 
7 
 
global product identifiers such as the EAN or UPC 2 usually return precise results, but can lead to poor 
recall as this information is often not present in offers at platforms such as auction sites. On the other 
hand, more general queries for the product type or manufacturer (e.g., “Gucci” in the category 
sunglasses) have a better chance of returning all relevant offers, but will also return a large number of 
irrelevant offers that have to be filtered out afterwards. Hence, the precision for such queries is often 
rather low.   
Putting these criteria together requires a system for a customized search for product offers in online 
sales platforms. According to the requirements of the user, the system must formulate search queries 
to retrieve the specified products by using the search interface or web API. At best, no relevant 
products are missing in the result set and no irrelevant products are included. Also, the result should 
not contain duplicates, i.e., the same offers occurring twice or more. Formulating such queries is called 
query generation. The implementation of this task is challenging but can build on recent research 
results, e.g. in the area of mashup applications that query information at run time, (Endrullis, Thor and 
Rahm 2009) (Barbosa and Freire 2004). Some of these approaches have already been applied for 
finding product offers, e.g. to monitor and compare their prices (Wartner and Kitschke 2011) (Endrullis, 
Thor and Rahm 2012). For a list of specific products, these approaches can either generate a single 
query per product, e.g. using information from the product title specified in the input, or it can be tried 
to find several products in a single query, e.g. if they share the same manufacturer or product type.  
Data extraction and transformation  
After queries are generated and executed, the results are stored and the relevant data has to be 
extracted from the resulting web pages of the shop. Data extraction is easy if the website provides an 
API to programmatically submit queries and retrieve query results including relevant attributes as title, 
                                                             
2
 EAN – European Article Number, UPC – Universal Product Code 
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product id, price, seller, user rating etc.. Otherwise web scrapers must be employed to extract the 
relevant information from the HTML code of the query result pages. This process can be error-prone 
and implies a higher effort of creating and maintaining web wrappers.  
The extracted product offers generally need further data transformation and cleaning to ensure 
sufficient quality for the further workflow steps of clustering and analysis. There are different 
techniques to remove irrelevant or invalid product offers, such as privately owned products in auction 
sites or offers that lack basic information like the price or title. Some product groups may require 
specific transformation steps to better support the comparison of their offers. For example, perfume 
items are typically sold in different sizes ranging from sample sizes of 5 ml up to large packages of 250 
ml or more. It is thus important to extract the respective size and perhaps also to compute a 
normalized price, e.g., the price per ml, for easier price comparison. Other product type specific 
preprocessing steps are the unification of clothing sizes and mapping synonyms to a single 
representation (e.g. “bag”, “evening bag”, “leather bag”, “hand bag”  “purse” in the accessories 
domain). 
Clustering of product offers 
The next step in the workflow is the assignment of the extracted offers to specific input products or the 
clustering of equivalent product offers. This is necessary since we want to use a counterfeit detection 
approach that considers differences between offers for the same product in addition to individual offer 
attributes. Clustering or matching of offers is challenging due to their high heterogeneity and missing 
information. For example, product titles in offers for the same product may differ considerably. For a 
product officially named “Gucci Sun Dream MD-120b”, found offer titles may include “SunDream 
MD120b” or “Blue Gucci Sun Dream purse, model 120b”. Some offer titles may only say “Nice Sun 
Dream purse from Gucci” thereby lacking significant product details.   
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Determining offers referring to the same product is a special case of object matching (or entity 
resolution) which aims at finding equivalent data objects in a dataset referring to the same real-world 
entity. This problem has been intensively studied already and there many available match approaches 
typically utilizing a combination of similarity scores for different attributes (Elmagarmid, Ipeirotes and 
Verykios 2007). For example, one can evaluate the lexicographic similarity of the object names or other 
attributes. This way, an object matcher can easily recognize that two objects “Blue Gucci, MD120b” and 
“Gucci MD-120b (blue)” are highly similar so that they likely represent the same object. The use of 
dictionaries and thesauri helps to discover synonyms and to deal with homonyms. As pointed out in  in  
(Köpcke, et al. 2012), matching product offers is especially challenging and needs tailored approaches  
by considering information about the manufacturer and product type.  
For our purposes, we not only have to decide whether two offers refer to the same product but we 
want to group all matching offers for the same product in one cluster. Only then it is possible to 
compare all relevant offers with each other, e.g., with respect to their price. To cluster similar product 
offers, we propose the use of a hierarchical bottom up clustering. The main advantage of this approach 
is that the number of elements in each cluster does not have to be known upfront and the clusters do 
not overlap, which is the case with other state-of-the-art clustering approaches such as k-Means.  
The proposed clustering algorithm is illustrated in Listing 1. Initially, each element (product offer) 
represents a separate cluster. We call the algorithm with the initial list of clusters and a minimal 
similarity threshold to be met by all pairs of elements in a cluster.  The algorithm iteratively determines 
for each current cluster l the cluster j with the highest similarity. For this purpose, we define the 
similarity between two clusters as the smallest similarity between any two elements from the different 
clusters (function CalculateSimilarity).  If the highest similarity between clusters l and j is above the 
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minimal similarity threshold the two clusters are merged since their offers likely refer to the same 
product. This process is continued as long as there are further pairs of clusters that can be merged.  
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INPUT: Clusterlist L, minimal pairwise similarity 
FOR EACH Cluster I in L 
Determine cluster j in L with largest similarity s 
IF s > minimal pairwise similarity 
THEN  mergeClusters( i, j) 
ELSE  quit 
END IF 
END FOR 
 
FUNCTION mergeClusters( Cluster i, Cluster j) 
Cluster k = cluster i ⋃ cluster j 
Insert k in L 
Remove i, j from L 
END 
 
FUNCTION calculateSimilarity( Cluster i, Cluster j) 
minConfidence = 1 
FOR EACH x in i and y in j 
Caclulate confidence c of (x, y) using a match tool 
IF c < minConfidence 
THEN  minConfidence = c 
END IF 
END FOR 
RETURN  minConfidence 
END 
Listing 1 Pseudo code for hierarchical clustering 
The table below shows a simple scenario with two clusters X, Y, each containing two elements x1, x2 
resp. y1, y2, that are compared with each other. Thus, we have to compare the similarity between each 
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pair of cluster elements. The minimum value is 0.93 (similarity between x2 and y2), so we say that the 
similarity between these two clusters is 0.93. If this similarity exceeds the minimal similarity threshold 
and if no other cluster pair has a score above 0.93, we would combine the two clusters X and Y. 
 X 
x1 x2 
 
Y 
y1 1.0 0.98 
y2 0.97 0.93 
Table 1 Clustering example 
Scoring   
To determine how suspicious an offer in a cluster is, we apply a scoring function to calculate a 
confidence score for each offer. This scoring function can consider several traits or indicators of 
“typical” counterfeits. One of the most significant traits of an imitation is the considerably lower price 
compared to the original product. Although there may be counterfeits having the same price as the 
original product, based on our experience it is the most important trait to find likely counterfeit offers 
on the web. This is also because the most important criterion for a consumer to buy fake products is a 
low price (Schuchert-Güler and Eisend 2003). Further indicators include according to (Schäfer, et al. 
2008) and (Jordan and Kutter 2012):  
 Retailer/seller rating including user feedback 
 Dubious method of payments (e.g., WesternUnion, where a refund is not possible) 
 Country of origin of the product (since many counterfeits come from a few countries including 
China) 
 Missing seller or product information  
 Missing certifications 
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 Unusual package sizes (e.g., in medication, where bulk packages suggest a counterfeit, because 
they are usually not sold to consumers) 
 Grammatical and orthographical mistakes in product  description  
 Type and volume of other products offered by a seller.  
 
Figure 2: Suspicious product offer from the platform alibaba.com 
Figure 2 show an example of a suspicious product offer with some of the mentioned indicators, such as 
unusual low price, payment method and volume of available products.  
By contrast, there exist traits that indicate a reliable offer, e.g., a retailer who has a large product range, 
a generally good reputation or whose account already exists for a long time. Our approach uses a 
scoring function which regards some of the criteria listed above and calculates the reliability 
(trustworthiness) of an offer.  
The scoring function is a linear combination of scores based on different indicators with each having a 
certain weight: 
𝑠 =  
𝑤1∗𝑠1+𝑤2∗𝑠2+⋯+𝑤𝑛∗𝑠𝑛 
𝑛
         ( ∑ 𝑤 = 1,  𝑠𝑖 = [0, 1] )𝑖   
 
An indicator for the price can be a function like the following:  
𝑠𝑝 =  
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
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This leads to a score that decreases with price deviations below the average price in a cluster of offers. 
For the seller rating we often have a direct value from the data source which can be normalized and 
used directly. For instance, eBay provides already a rating of sellers in percent. Other sites may use 
stars which can be mapped to numerical values. Indicators like the payment method or origin can be 
mapped to numerical values just by categorizing origin countries or payment methods in groups and 
assigning each group a value between 0 and 1. In the simplest case indicators for counterfeits can just 
be assigned a one for existing in an offer there and a zero otherwise. The scoring function generally 
depends on the domain and sales platform. 
Case Study Setup   
Scope   
To test the applicability of the described workflow we evaluated it regarding the two steps that 
influence the quality the most: The clustering step and the scoring step that allows the final 
categorization in good offers and likely fakes. Without a correct clustering of similar offers we cannot 
effectively use a scoring function that relies on comparisons between offers of the same type (e.g. one 
that puts heavy weight on price differences and not just absolute prices). If a satisfactory clustering can 
be achieved the scoring function has to be evaluated the give insight into the overall quality of the 
approach. Evaluation of query generation and data extraction is beyond the scope of this initial study. 
For our evaluation we thus focus on relatively easy to find product offers. We also consider only offers 
from the eBay platform were we can use a comprehensive API3 to quickly gather all the information 
needed.   
                                                             
3
  eBay Developers Program, go.developer.ebay.com 
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For our case study we cannot provide definite answers on whether presumed counterfeit offers really 
refer to faked products as we do not have the real products and their assessment by experts. For 
evaluation purposes, we try to manually estimate the correctness of the final scoring step based on the 
content of the comments belonging to a seller (external and on the site), the overall offer description as 
well as factors like if traders have been banned at some time after the data was extracted.   
Test data 
In order to judge the effectiveness of our approach, we generated a sample query to see how many 
suspicious offers were detected. We first defined a specific company and a general product. For the 
evaluation we focused on several brand products that are often targeted by counterfeiters and offered 
on the web. We looked at multiple types of clothing products (brand shoes and shirts) and well known 
perfumes that fall into higher price segments. Overall we extracted 1341 offers (see Table 2). Offers 
refer to a product that can be easily found by querying the product name and manufacturer while 
applying a certain category as a filter for the output. We decided to use the product type Eau de 
Toilette for the evaluation of the final scoring of offers in regard to the likelihood of being offers for 
counterfeit goods. These offers and their respective venders were manually flagged as counterfeits or 
non-counterfeits based on the user comments on the platform and external sites as well as the deletion 
of offers by the platform owner. 
Product # of offers 
# of manually validated 
counterfeits 
Brand Sport Shoes 321 - 
Brand Shirt 233 - 
Eau De Toilette 787 78 
Table 2 Test Products and # of offers 
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Clustering and scoring method  
For clustering we used the described approach on hierarchical clustering.  We use a combination of 
lexicographic matchers to calculate the score for each element pair between clusters. For our tests we 
used a minimal pairwise similarity of 0.7. 
For the scoring the trustworthiness of offers, we started with a scoring function that regards the price, 
the retailer rating and the country of origin. Our formula originally looked as follows, with 𝑤𝑖  being the 
weights and 𝑠𝑖  being the scores of the several parameters we regard: 
𝑠 =  
𝑤1∗𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒+𝑤2∗𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔+𝑤3∗𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛 
3
         ( ∑ 𝑤 = 1,  𝑠𝑖 = [0, 1] )𝑖  
For price scoring we use   
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.25)
 
Thus, the confidence of an offer decreases linearly with the deviation from the maximum price of the 
cluster. We declare a small scope below the maximum price as confidential, e.g. 25 %, but products that 
are cheaper are gradually assigned lower scores.  The scoring functions for the retailer is the 
percentage of positive ratings retrieved for a seller and the function for the origin assigns a score of 0.5 
to the top countries frequently being involved in counterfeits and a score of 1 for other countries. 
We planned on specifically weighting and testing multiple combinations. However, experiments quickly 
showed that rating and country of origin cannot be used as reliable scoring factors for the eBay 
platform using the chosen products. There was no correlation between rating and likelihood of 
counterfeit offers. Although the seller score provided by eBay appears to be a sensible criterion to 
judge the confidence of a product offer, it revealed to be rather misleading. First of all, we found 
possible counterfeit sellers having a perfect score of 100 %, while we also found sellers having a lower 
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score even though their accounts belong to well-known retailers. Note that 98 % is already a very low 
score on eBay, because most users give positive or neutral feedback.  
Taking a closer look on the negative user comments, we found out that most users complained about 
long delivery times (or even no delivery of the ordered product at all), broken or damaged products, 
receiving the wrong product (or a wrong size, color etc. of it), impolite or even abusive retailers, 
troubles when trying to return the product and to obtain the full refund etc. These are apparently the 
everyday problems users of eBay have to deal with, while only very few complaints are about (possible) 
fake products. Although it might be assumed that an unreliable retailer might also tend to be a 
counterfeiter, such a conclusion is quite speculative. Additionally, we often found negative feedback 
referring to a disappointing product which is however beyond the responsibility of the retailer.  
The scoring function generally depends on the domain and sales platform. The importance of indicators 
for counterfeits on the eBay platform for shoes might be different from indicators for all web shops and 
a different product.  However, the price is an attribute that always exists and at the same time the most 
important indicator. Because of that we finally limited our tests to essentially using the scorePrice 
function alone. 
Results  
Clustering 
Table 3 shows the effectiveness of the described clustering approach for the 3 different product types. 
Accuracy in this case refers to the percentage of clusters containing only offers for the same product 
(all T-shirts of type A in one cluster, T-shirts of type B in a different cluster etc.). Offers for the same 
product that fall into different cluster are not inherently bad for our approach if the clusters are still 
large enough. We also specify the number of “superfluous clusters” that are not correct but refer to a 
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single product so that they could be merged with another cluster. On average we obtained about 80 
percent correct clusters and about 20 percent of clusters that are superfluous or contain different 
offers which can lead to wrong scoring of offers. 
Product 
# of 
clusters 
# of correct 
clusters 
# of superfluous 
clusters 
Accurac
y 
Sport 
Shoes 
37 30 4 0,81 
Brand 
Shirt 
34 29 2 0,85 
EDT 54 41 5 0,76 
Overall 125 100 11 0,80 
Table 3 Clustering quality 
Considering, the high heterogeneity of product offers the achieved clustering thus can be seen a 
satisfactory. We will also evaluate the quality impact for a corrected clustering where we merge the 
offers of superfluous clusters with their real clusters.   
Overall quality 
To gain insight in the overall quality of the scoring step and the influence of the clustering step we test 
the counterfeit scoring with both the results of the fully automatic clustering and with a manually 
corrected clustering. 
Table 4 shows the result of our approach with the fully automatic clustering. The scoring function 
returns a score between 0 and 1 that denotes how likely it is that an offer is for a counterfeit product. 
We chose the thresholds 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9 for classifying offers into reliable offers if they score 
above the threshold and counterfeit offers if they score below.  Table 4 shows the precision, recall and 
f-measure values for each of the threshold values.  
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The precision is the percentage of offers that were correctly classified as suspicious by our approach:  
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
|offers automatically classified as counterfeits  ∩  offers manually classified as counterfeits|
|offers automatically classified as counterfeits|
.  
By contrast, recall is the ratio of the manually flagged suspicious offers that could be found 
automatically:    
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
|offers automatically classified as counterfeits  ∩  offers manually classified as counterfeits|
|offers manually classified as counterfeits|
.  
The F-Measure is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. 
Threshold Recall Precision F-Measure 
0,6 0,064 0,833 0,119 
0,7 0,564 0,543 0,553 
0,8 0,564 0,283 0,378 
0,9 0,564 0,22 0,317 
Table 4 Results after automatic clustering step 
It can be seen that a high (reliability) threshold leads to more offers falling below it and being classified 
as not reliable. The result then includes a high amount of the manually flagged offers thereby improving 
recall. By contrast, precision improves for lower thresholds as these reduce the likelihood of false 
counterfeit candidates. The threshold of 0.7 produces the best balance resulting in the highest F-
Measure value. At this point the recall stays stable compared with higher thresholds while the precision 
is already at a good level.   
Table 5 shows the results when the clustering is manually corrected. In this case, precision is perfect for 
the 0.6 threshold, i.e., there are no false positives in the offers classified as counterfeits. This is made 
possible by the correct clustering so that only the prices for offers of the same product are compared 
with each other and threshold 0.6 refers to unrealistically large price differences. The best F-Measure is 
again achieved for threshold 0.7. Compared to the automatic clustering case (Table 4) we observe the 
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same recall but an improved precision due to the corrected clustering.  The overall F-Measure improved 
from 55 to about 60%. 
 
Threshold Recall Precision F-Measure 
0,6 0,051 1 0,098 
0,7 0,564 0,628 0,595 
0,8 0,564 0,4 0,468 
0,9 0,564 0,244 0,341 
Table 5 Results for manually corrected clustering 
Altogether, 10.3 % of the offers (81 of 787) were flagged as suspicious fully automatically when using 
threshold 0.7. In our case study we found out that 54.3 % of these offers (44) are most likely real 
counterfeit offers. While the evaluation results are not yet perfect, they show the viability of the 
proposed approach as it is possible to let the user only verify a smaller subset of the offers (81 instead 
of 781 offers) which can mean a significant time savings for counterfeit detection.  
One interesting result was that suspicious retailers who appeared in more than one cluster, had offers 
with very bad scores in every cluster. For instance, there was one highly suspicious retailer having offers 
in 9 clusters. The scores of the offers were very low in every cluster. This indicates it may be a good idea 
to use such collected evidence about suspicious retailers in future scorings.    
Conclusion & Future Work 
 
We proposed a new approach to semi-automatically identify offers of counterfeits in online sales 
platforms such as large auction sites or web shops. The approach is based on a workflow with 
automatic generation of search queries for the products of interest as well as a clustering and scoring 
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the trustworthiness of product offers. The initial evaluation showed the viability of the proposed 
approach but also the need for further improvements. The proposed clustering scheme worked 
relatively well but can be manually corrected by merging several clusters with offers for the same 
product. The manual verification of likely counterfeits can be restricted to smaller subsets of the 
product offers thereby limiting the effort for counterfeit identification.  
In future work, we see the need to evaluate and fine-tune the propose approach for additional sales 
platforms and product types. The used scoring based on price is only a first step and should be 
extended with additional criteria based on product type, sales platform and perhaps insights from initial 
evaluations, e.g. about suspicious retailers. 
An inherent limitation remains the difficult manual decision about whether a suspicious offer is really 
about a faked product. Hence the manual verification and fine-tuning should ideally be performed in 
collaboration with experts affected by counterfeits such as the manufacturers of frequently faked 
products or platform owners.  
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